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To achieve strategic objectives, the U.S. forms effective coalitions with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners and builds their capacity before the battle through strategic engagement involving all the instruments of national power. At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) maintained significant capability to engage with these emerging partners. Anticipating decreased available military resources in the USEUCOM footprint, what are the best ways and means to execute a productive military-to-military engagement strategy that continues to build our partners' capacity? What means and ways provide our partners with self-sustainable capability that maintains trust and ensures willingness to meet NATO obligations in unknown future security dilemmas? This research project examines current USEUCOM security cooperation ways and means. It considers the impact of decreasing resources on the current strategy and offers an alternative for less resource intensive, high impact partner capacity building by developing maneuver combat training center capacity in our partners.
BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY THROUGH COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS
Much has been written in the last ten years about operational and tactical application of security assistance to build partner capacity (BPC) in developing security forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and other theaters of importance to extract United States forces from combat and stability operations. These operations to prepare our partners for the transition of security responsibilities to them, a pre-condition for U.S. withdrawal, provide a wealth of documented experience, general rules and explicit techniques, tactics and procedures to achieve the desired partner capacity in the context of those operational theaters. There is a greater scope of security assistance and partner capacity building that requires examination to refine how we succeed in these activities to achieve the prevention and shaping goals that support U.S. objectives in every region of the globe. pursue the development of their own maneuver combat training center capability based on the unique U.S. model. Assisting our partners in development of their own combat training centers offers a way to significantly build capabilities that produce lasting capacity in our partners for a small investment. As the United States looks for innovative and low cost ways to develop capability and capacity in our partners around the globe, the 7A JMTC model provides a promising example.
Implications of the Defense Strategic Guidance
The DSG formally publicizes United States security policy decisions previously hinted at by the administration as a result of a review directed by President Obama.
International and domestic influences are shaping a fundamental transition in the focus Building on a trend in previous security strategy documents and these public announcements, the DSG formalizes a policy focus shift toward the Asia-Pacific, announces our intention to decrease our military presence in Europe and the Middle East, and emphasizes our increased reliance for security on partnership with others. As a result, it reinforces the theme of developing the security capabilities of others that permits greater burden sharing of security interests. Cooperation with willing and capable partners is the keystone to our future security and the key to achieving willing and capable partners is U.S. security cooperation efforts to build their own capability and capacity.
Comprehensive efforts to build partnership and partner capacity are critical to the success of the strategic approach outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). It describes a strategic approach that achieves four enduring national interests of security, economic prosperity, respect for universal values, and maintenance of a stable international order through comprehensive engagement efforts based upon a strong national foundation. 5 Security and a stable international order set favorable and necessary conditions for the growth of our economic prosperity and projection of our values. The strategy acknowledges that these condition-setting interests will be achieved only through comprehensive, multilateral efforts with our allies, partners and potential partners globally.
Sustained engagement yields important outcomes including improved partner capabilities, constructive influence with our partners' military and civilian leadership, and access to facilities and resources that prove critical in times of crisis. The 2008 National
Defense Strategy (NDS) clearly outlines the importance of achieving these outcomes to influence the choices of key states and maintain strategic access and freedom of U.S.
action. 6 Deliberate engagement to build partner capacity includes a broad range of tools across the spectrum of national instruments of power. In an effort to develop capable partners, the U.S. employs security cooperation and assistance programs aimed at their abilities to secure themselves and to contribute to multinational responses to security challenges regionally and globally.
Security Cooperation, Assistance and Capacity Building Defined
As defined in Joint Publication 1-02, the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, security cooperation consists of all DoD interactions with foreign militaries that promote U.S. security interests through relationships, improved partner military capabilities, and assured access for U.S. forces to critical locations required for peacetime or contingency operations. 7 Security assistance is an element of security cooperation comprised of legislatively approved and funded programs to provide equipment, training and defense-related services by grant, loan or cash sales. 8 Under the aegis of security cooperation, U.S. military engagement takes the form of security force assistance, defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as, "The DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions." 9 In the absence of formal joint definitions for the terms capability and capacity, the Rand Arroyo Center study, Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations, describes capability as "the ability to perform a function" and capacity as "the extent of a capability present." 10 Authors occasionally and incorrectly mix and match these terms in current writing about partner capacity building. In short, capability describes the nature of functional ability a partner possesses while capacity describes the extent to which a partner can sustain and employ that capability.
U.S. strategy highlights the increased importance of qualitative partner capacity building as both ways and means to achieve our national security interests. The U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet outlining the U.S. Army's concept for BPC defines it as, "The outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions." 11 The concept of BPC is often cited in national security documents as one of the primary means of achieving national security interests, but there is no current formal joint definition. BPC is clearly an outcome of security cooperation and assistance achieved through military engagement and security force assistance.
Building partner military capacity supports strengthened alliances composed of partners whose professional, civilian-led militaries provide their own security and contribute to regional and global security efforts. U.S. investment to achieve these positive outcomes causes these nations to continue to view the U.S. as the partner of choice in collective efforts. As outlined in both the 2008 NDS and 2010 National Military Strategy (NMS), strong alliances and partnerships promote regional security and stability. 12 Engagement to develop partner capacity is a fundamental way to achieve national objectives to build resilient alliances and partnerships that contribute directly to improved U.S. national security. Prepared by the DoD, the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) provides directive guidance to U.S. regional and functional combatant commanders for security cooperation activities that provides a bridge from policy to operations.
The GEF outlines strategic end states and security cooperation focus areas directly applicable to BPC. Attaining these security cooperation focus areas builds operational capacity in our partners through training, equipping, and human capital development. These security cooperation efforts produce lasting institutional development that leaves our partners with combined operations capacity with or in lieu of U.S. resources. Our NATO partners will logically evaluate the basis of U.S. strategic decisions impacting the NATO alliance. The DSG and subsequent U.S. explanations supporting changes in focus and force structure clearly outline the strategic considerations influencing these decisions. Our NATO partners will assess, no doubt, the unstated objectives of U.S. engagement as well. As described in the NMS, access to forward locations for power projection remains critical to U.S. national security interests. 21 It is reasonable to assume our NATO partners see U.S. objectives to sustain access to critical nodes for regional and global response, in conjunction with NATO partners or without. Gary Schmitt, director of advanced strategic studies at the American Enterprise
Institute, opines that the U.S. presence in Europe is more to support rapid force projection and less about European partnerships. 22 26 Displayed daily in theaters like Afghanistan, the capabilities of these partners are a direct result of shared relationships and training achieved through combined training exercises in Europe. 27 General Odierno stated that the U.S. will sustain relationships, build partner capacity, and meet combined exercise requirements through rotational unit deployments that augment a smaller U.S. force structure in Europe. 28 These rotational forces are critical to sustaining engagement in the form of combined training and readiness exercises that build capability and leave residual partner capacity in place. To achieve these effects, the U.S. must maintain engagement over time and focus on incrementally developing self-sustaining capabilities in our partners. These types of multinational, multi-echelon exercises are routinely conducted by the 7A JMTC, either at existing comprehensive U.S. facilities in Germany or exported to training facilities in other host countries. interests in Europe rely on a strong NATO alliance. This alliance must be capable of maintaining regional stability, prosperity, democracy and security; be willing to act multilaterally in response to global security issues, and it establishes conditions for productive relations with non-NATO regional powers like Russia. 31 The Role of the Combat Training Center in Building Partner Capacity
One of the ways USEUCOM affects partner capacity is through military-tomilitary training exercises and exchanges with partner countries like Romania, Poland, and other former Eastern Bloc countries. Implemented to increase troop contributing nation capabilities for specific operational theaters, these training exercises and exchanges have produced lasting capabilities in these countries that surpass the immediate operational requirements to support NATO efforts Afghanistan. The EUCOM security cooperation strategy employs a broad spectrum of tools to impact partner capability, but these exchanges create sustainable military capability in our partners at a relatively low cost.
U.S. engagement methods must leave behind self-sustainable capability at the conclusion of each engagement with partner nations to achieve the greatest gain at least cost. Producing enduring institutional capacity in NATO partners through a program of military engagement remains the most cost effective way to sustain strong
U.S. relationships. Growing competition for decreasing U.S. military resources in
Europe requires carefully planned engagement to improve this institutional training capacity.
The ways currently available in Europe in the form of the 7A JMTC do not require significant redesign to achieve this objective. However, the U.S. must carefully define the measures of effectiveness that describe the level of self-sustaining capacity achieved. Those assessments then directly affect the next round of engagement with those partners. Routine assessment ensures that the U.S. builds capability with each engagement and achieves positive return from our efforts.
The DSG implies greater reliance on partner capacity to secure national security interests. As security cooperation activities receive greater attention and a more substantial share of available resources, the U.S. must develop objective measures of performance and effectiveness to guide programming decisions. Measuring the effectiveness of capacity building activities remains a significant challenge for associated U.S. security cooperation programs. Because of this, the U.S. must be able to measure the actual impact of its engagement programs on resulting capacity developed by and in partners. A recent Rand study of the U.S. Global Train and Equip Program, the "1206 Program," 32 reveals that the U.S. lacks a formal, empirical method to measure the outcome of capacity-building programs. 33 This Rand study finds that current assessment methods for security cooperation activities are largely subjective in nature. In general, implementers of security cooperation activities can articulate positive impacts of these programs, but these assessments lack formality and standardization. The study also reveals that in most cases, U.S. assessments are conducted by the program implementers and, therefore, are subject to bias or the perception of bias on the part of the implementers. 34 The Rand study offers worthy recommendations for developing objective assessment methods specifically for 1206 Program management that can be applied to all U.S. security cooperation activities. Regardless of the security cooperation ways employed, the framework to assess U.S. investment in BPC programs requires further study. JMTC capabilities serve as a model for developing capabilities in Romania, Croatia, Poland and other countries. 44 As General Odierno pointed out in recent remarks, the U.S. will continue to develop partnerships and partner capability at multiple levels at the existing 7A JMTC complex as part of U.S. efforts to sustain NATO partnerships. 45 In the As an example, in Fiscal Year 2010, the U.S. expended $13.9 million in Section 1206 funds to support Romania's training and preparation efforts to support NATO efforts in Afghanistan. 47 The combat training center development efforts by the 7A JMTC cost less than $300,000 in the same period. 48 The 7A 
Risk
The U.S. will not be able to rely solely on developing combat training center capacity to build the partnerships necessary to support our national security interests.
Clearly, this way of building partner capacity is land power focused. While multinational combat training center exercises can improve joint and combined interoperability, they primarily impact partner capacity in the land domain. The value of the combat training center outputs is centered more in the long-term institutional DOTLMPF effects. It is only one of a set of ways and means to develop capable and confident partners. To mitigate this risk, U.S. security cooperation activities must be carefully balanced across the partner's service components based on the capabilities needed.
The development of training center capability, particularly maneuver combat training capabilities, is not a "one size fits all" proposition. The U.S. must carefully select appropriate partners for investment based on existing capability and capacity, a demonstrated willingness to invest in themselves within their means, and a willingness to sustain the capability over time. 49 In the Asia-Pacific region, the defense strategy relies heavily on strategic reach achieved through sea and air power, but the region is home to seven of the ten largest armies in the world. Furthermore, 22 of the 28 nations in the region have Army generals as their chiefs of defense. For these reasons, General Odierno highlights the important role U.S. land forces will play engaging with our partners there. 54 Building on existing multinational exercises and developing partner combat training center capability in the region offers a constructive way and means to engage with and develop multiple partners. U.S. engagement with Australia and New Zealand demonstrate ongoing pursuit of increased training capacity in both countries that strengthens the enduring partnership with both allies. It also expands U.S. outreach to other regional militaries through existing relationships held by Australia and New Zealand. 55 Clear strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific region and a continued reliance on stalwart NATO partners in Europe, as acknowledged in the NSS, make security cooperation considerations fairly straightforward. Regions of lesser stated priority have no less need for carefully developed security cooperation. The U.S. faces considerable resource challenges for security cooperation in Africa and Central and South America, where conditions tend toward less stability and security capabilities are less welldeveloped. In response to the defense strategic guidance and budget impacts, the Chief of Staff of the Army observed that the U.S. must employ "innovative, low-cost and smallfootprint approaches to conduct engagements, maintain stability and build partner capacity." 56 The combat training center model offers a way to satisfy those criteria and produce all the DOTLMPF benefits demonstrated by the examples in Europe referenced earlier. Because national capability can yield significant prestige for partners, development of partner combat training center capabilities opens the way for sustained capacity improvement, stronger relationships and improved access to our strategic partners.
Conclusion
Any successful future engagement strategy to build partner capacity in Europe will focus efforts on recurring, developmental engagement at the individual, small unit collective levels. Engagement and exercises must also challenge appropriate combined headquarters to respond multilaterally to regional and global contingencies. USEUCOM security cooperation engagement priorities and plans must align security cooperation efforts with, and be reinforced by, security assistance programs with each of our partners. Security cooperation plans must judiciously apply available forces and leverage CONUS-based means, such as we currently do through the National Guardresourced State Partnership Program and through rotational unit deployments to
Europe as envisioned by Secretary of Defense Panetta. 57 Additional ways include maximizing multinational, multi-echeloned training opportunities at existing U.S. and partner nation combat training centers in Europe as well as seeking affordable exercise opportunities for our partners in CONUS combat training center venues.
Helping partners develop their own combat training center capacity provides a relatively cost effective way to bridge the gap between desired ends and the available means. This approach satisfies the following three tenets of a comprehensive BPC approach: it creates recurring engagement that sustains partner trust and confidence; it develops enduring capabilities that prevent and deter regional instability by improving operational capacity in the short term and self-sustaining institutional capacity in the long term; and it focuses on partner nation human capital, providing the vehicle for lasting impact on our partners' professional security force capability. 58 The U.S. can build and sustain the partnerships required by the DSG to secure mutual security interests through carefully developed BPC efforts. As part of a comprehensive BPC approach, the U.S. can help others develop their own combat training center capacity with limited investment. The U.S. model of combat training centers produce constructive military proficiency in our partners that sustain both their capability and willingness to share the security challenges presented by the future strategic environment.
Endnotes
